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Note
Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law and Internet Legal Resources
Mathew Rotenberg∗
In July 2004, Ernest Chavis drafted a will at the request of
1
his 91-year-old former neighbor, Annie Belle Weiss. Chavis
used a “Quicken lawyer disk” to generate the document on his
computer, filled in the blanks, and brought the will to Ms.
2
Weiss to sign. After Ms. Weiss’s death, Chavis was sued by Ms.
Weiss’s family members who alleged Chavis had “engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law” in violation of a South Caro3
lina statute. In January 2007, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina agreed with Ms. Weiss’s family, and found that
4
Chavis had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Interestingly, the court raised no objections to the document itself,
nor did the court deny that the document likely effectuated Ms.

∗ J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks
first and foremost to my father, Mark Rotenberg, who acted as a mentor
throughout the process of writing this Note, as he has for the past 25 years of
my life. Thanks to Professors Richard Painter and Robert Stein for their valuable advice and guidance. Thanks to Matthew Lippert, the staff, and editors of
Minnesota Law Review for their many contributions to this Note. A special
thanks to Chris Schmitter, Brian Burke, and Michael Benchimol for their loyalty and friendship and who encouraged me to write this Note with Gangnam
style. Finally, this Note could never have been written without the loyalty and
support of my mother Beth Pearlman, my strongest advocate and executive
producer of my life. Copyright © 2012 by Mathew Rotenberg.
1. Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873, 875 (S.C. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id; see id. at 876 (explaining that under South Carolina law, “even the
preparation of standard forms that require no creative drafting may constitute
the practice of law” and “the purpose of prohibiting the unauthorized practice
of law is to protect the public”); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b)(2)
(2012) (“A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
hold out to the public . . . that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this
jurisdiction.”); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b)(2) (2012)
(same).
4. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d at 876.
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Weiss’s intent. Though Chavis used the Internet to create inexpensive and accurate documents that memorialized the will
of his elderly neighbor, the court formalistically applied the unauthorized practice of law rules of South Carolina and found
Chavis in violation of state law.
The formalistic application of unauthorized practice rules
is not limited to the state of South Carolina. Case law from
many jurisdictions holds that the generation of legal documents
by lay people—whether over the Internet or in person—
6
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. This strict application of unauthorized practice statutes is also not isolated to
individuals; Internet legal providers (ILPs) have recently encountered other direct legal assaults. On August 22, 2011,
around 15,000 litigants settled a class action suit against In7
ternet legal forms provider LegalZoom.com, Inc. The suit,
which alleged violations of the Missouri unauthorized practice
8
of law statute, is only one example of recent legal action
9
against ILPs.
The emergence of ILPs, and litigation involving them, ex10
poses a largely unsettled legal terrain. State legislatures
drafted most unauthorized practice statutes prior to the emer5. See id. at 877. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not nullify the
will, stating “it should not be invalidated simply because it was drafted by a
nonlawyer.” Id. (citing Peterson v. Howland (In re Peterson’s Estate), 42
N.W.2d 59, 66 (Minn. 1950)).
6. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document
Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811,
836–49 (2002) (discussing a Texas court decision to enjoin the sale of a CDROM that provided advice on how to fill out legal forms, and a series of federal
bankruptcy court decisions to enjoin lay people from advising debtors through
the preparation of legal forms).
7. Nathan Koppel, Seller of Online Legal Forms Settles Unauthorized
Practice of Law Suit, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/23/seller-of-online-legal-forms-settles
-unauthorized-practiced-of-law-suit/.
8. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 508 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
9. See, e.g., Frankfort Digital Servs. v. Kistler (In re Reynoso), 477 F.3d
1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the website, owned by a non-lawyer,
that “offer[ed] legal advice and projected an aura of expertise concerning
bankruptcy petitions,” constituted unauthorized practice of law); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir.
1999) (vacating an order to enjoin a company from selling legal software because the Texas Legislature had enacted a statute specifying that the sale of
computer software did not constitute the practice of law).
10. See Melissa Blades & Sarah Vermylen, Virtual Ethics for a New Age:
The Internet and the Ethical Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 651 (2004)
(stating that case law on the topic of ILPs is “sparse”).
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gence of the Internet or without any focus on recent advance11
ments in computer research capabilities. For that reason, these statutes lack clarity and their application to ILPs is outdated
and forced. In addition, ILPs inherently exist in a multijurisdictional setting, the Internet, which is unlike the traditional localized legal practices these statutes anticipated. There
are potentially fifty different legal structures which govern
12
ILPs, creating myriad and inconsistent regulation of Internet
legal space.
Advances in computer technology are effectively commoditizing the law and revolutionizing the ways in which individu13
als seek and receive legal services. ILPs present tremendous
14
potential for increased access to legal services. Efficient and
low-cost legal information is vital to an increasing number of
15
unrepresented litigants and to combat the shrinking amounts
16
of legal aid available to them. Technology has the potential to
benefit a court system significantly burdened by unprepared
17
and uninformed litigants. Seen in this light, the vague and
11. See generally Steve French, When Public Policies Collide . . . Legal
“Self-Help” Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 95–101, 120 (2001) (providing a thorough discussion of
the historical development of state specific practice of law definitions, and noting “that existing definitions and analytical approaches to the unauthorized
practice of law simply fail in the computer age”). For further discussion on the
development of the unauthorized practice of law rules in the context of selfhelp, see Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 123–48 (2000).
12. Compare, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(c) (West 2005) (“[T]he
‘practice of law’ does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution,
display, or sale, including publication, distribution, display, or sale by means
of an Internet web site, of . . . computer software, or similar products . . . .”),
with Kistler, 477 F.3d at 1126 (finding that the practice of law does include
operating a website that offers automated counsel in bankruptcy matters).
13. See Chris Johnson, Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 259, 262–66 (2009) (discussing the business models of
three online legal service providers).
14. See id. at 279–81 (arguing that consumers stand to benefit from the
availability of affordable legal services).
15. See generally Richard W. Painter, Symposium on Ethical Issues and
Trends in Family Law: Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A
Legal Crisis and its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45 (2011) (arguing that affordable
legal services are especially important in times of financial hardship in light of
research characterizing the poor quality of pro se litigation).
16. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 13, at 280–81 (citing the revenue from
interest on lawyers’ trust accounts as an important and declining source of legal aid funds).
17. See Painter, supra note 15, at 45 (“[L]itigants are generally doing a
poor job of representing themselves and are burdening the courts.” (citing ABA
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outmoded language of the unauthorized practice statutes, and
their uneven application, is a more serious problem than ever
before. It decreases confidence in the legal system, and prevents millions of potential users who stand to benefit significantly from the growth of ILPs.
This Note offers solutions to anachronistic and inconsistent
unauthorized practice of law statutes as they relate to nonattorney ILPs, while also recognizing that some regulation of
ILPs is needed. Part I of this Note examines the development of
the unauthorized practice statutes, the emergence of ILPs, and
their conflicting interests. Part II argues that unauthorized
practice statutes stifle the potential benefits of access to ILPs,
and that the potential benefit of increased access to ILPs outweighs the historic rationale behind strict unauthorized practice statutes. Part III advocates for the implementation of a
two-part solution: (1) states should adopt a new ABA Model
Rule that relaxes regulation of personalized and advanced features of ILPs, and (2) ILPs should be required to comply with
reasonable state disclosure and accreditation requirements.
Implementing this solution will remove the stifling barriers to
valuable legal technology, and in turn, dramatically increase
access to quality legal services.
I. SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF NON-ATTORNEY INTERNET LEGAL RESOURCES AND
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Information technology is advancing faster than the slow18
to-adapt, precedent-based U.S. legal system can regulate it.
This trend is especially pronounced in the case of the Internet,
which rapidly revolutionized the mechanisms and substance of
communication, and permeates into nearly “every facet of socie19
ty.” The history of regulating the practice of law, and the more
recent emergence of ILPs, illustrates two phenomena on a collision course; the outcome of which will determine how, and ultimately which, individuals receive legal services.
COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (2010))).
18. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 123 (“The explosion of information technology is growing faster than it can be regulated. Technology has outpaced the
states' capacity to develop rules for providing legal services electronically.”).
19. See Shari Claire Lewis & Dylan Braverman, The Internet “Big Bang”
Unauthorized Practice of Law in the Cyber Age, FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2007, 26,
26.

2012]

STIFLED JUSTICE

713

A. WHAT IS THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW?
Under principles of federalism, defining and regulating the
20
practice of law is traditionally a function of individual states.
Rules governing the unauthorized practice of law restrict the
conduct of both lawyers and non-lawyers, while state legisla21
tures and state courts promulgate those rules.
1. The Development of Unauthorized Practice of Law
Structures
Prior to the twentieth century, a non-lawyer violated the
unauthorized practice of law rules only by representing another
22
individual in court. State administration was straightforward
because those who appeared before the court were easily identi23
fiable. With the creation of bar associations in the early twentieth century, sophisticated regulations for the practice of law
began and many bar associations adopted objectives “to condi24
tion bar membership upon various educational requirements.”
The New York County Lawyers Association appointed the first
committee on unauthorized practice of law in 1914 in response
25
to a growing business industry and its overlapping legal work.
Until the 1930s, state bar associations focused primarily on
“nonlawyer appearances in court” and largely ignored the significant public danger that broader unauthorized practice of
26
law creates. “In the wake of the Depression,” however, numerous states’ bar associations formed unauthorized practice
20. See French, supra note 11, at 95; Christina L. Underwood, Balancing
Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 439 (2004).
21. La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Provisions to Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1137
(2001) (“Rules governing the unauthorized practice of law are usually statespecific legislative or court measures. Rules that prohibit the unauthorized
practice of law restrict the conduct of both lawyers and non-lawyers.”).
22. Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on Effective
Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 721 (2007).
23. Id.
24. See ABA COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS 16 (Aug. 1995), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/clientpro/Non_Lawyer_Activity
.authcheckdam.pdf.
25. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1981).
26. See id.
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committees and many states “enacted or broadened unauthor27
ized practice statutes.” The American Bar Association (ABA)
created its committee on unauthorized practice in 1930, and by
1938, over 400 unauthorized practice committees were estab28
lished. In the latter half of the twentieth century, unauthorized practice rules became more uniform as state courts implemented versions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
29
(Model Rules), promulgated by the ABA.
Today, a majority of states empower committees to investi30
gate and enforce unauthorized practice of law violations. In
many jurisdictions, the state supreme court creates and super31
vises these committees. In other jurisdictions, local bar associations create unauthorized practice committees, though they
32
are still subject to state supreme court oversight.
2. The Purpose of Prohibiting the Unauthorized Practice of
Law
The primary rationale offered for unauthorized practice of
law regulation is to protect the public from the consequences of
33
ineffectual legal services. According to the ABA Model Rules,
27. See id. at 8–9.
28. Id. at 8; see also French, supra note 11, at 97–98.
29. See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate
Out-of-State Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1046 n.136 (2002).
30. See French, supra note 11, at 98.
31. E.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:22-1 (West 2012) (“The Supreme Court shall appoint a committee on the unauthorized practice of law consisting of 21 attorneys of this State and four lay members.”); see French, supra note 11, at 98.
32. See French, supra note 11, at 98; e.g., RULES REGULATING THE
FLORIDA BAR: CH. 10. RULES GOVERNING THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW, RULE 10-1.1 (July 1, 2012),
available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/0/6141E3A803F2F

87C85256B29004BEB60/$FILE/RRTFB%20CHAPTER%2010.pdf?OpenElement

(“The Florida Bar, as an official arm of the court, is charged with the duty of
considering, investigating, and seeking the prohibition of matters pertaining
to the unlicensed practice of law and the prosecution of alleged offenders.”).
33. See James I. Averitt, Legal Ethics and the Internet: Defining a Lawyer ’s Professional Responsibility in a New Frontier, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 171,
173 (2004 – 2005) (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2005)) (“Comment 1 to Rule 5.05 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct describes the rationale for prohibiting nonlawyers from practicing law: ‘Courts generally have prohibited the unauthorized practice of law . . . to protect . . . the public . . . from the mistakes of the
untrained . . . .’”); French, supra note 11, at 96 (“The principal justification offered for unauthorized practice of law prohibitions is ‘to protect the public
from the consequences of inexpert legal services.’” (quoting MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT Ann. R. 5.5 cmt. (1996))).
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“[l]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects
the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified
34
persons.” This assumed justification has gone largely unchal35
lenged for over one hundred years.
Asserting public welfare as justification, attorneys, bar associations, and unauthorized practice committees have highlighted alleged problems arising from non-lawyers practicing
law. Untrained individuals can seriously harm a client with
advice on multifaceted legal issues without understanding the
36
complexities involved. Inaccurate advice can prejudice a cli37
ent’s case or lead to further expenses and litigation. Clients
may also have false expectations as to the scope and expertise
of the non-lawyer, as consumers are likely to expect legal ser38
vice providers to have legal training. Additionally, and perhaps most relevant to Internet practice, clients of non-lawyers
practicing law waive the protections provided by state rules
39
40
governing confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and attorney41
client privileges.
42
Finally, the legal profession is a very big business. Unauthorized practice statutes unquestionably shield the profession
43
from most external competition. While the economic motivations of the bar are beyond the scope of this Note, it is clear
from empirical study that public policy concerns were not the

34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (1995).
35. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 139.
36. See Underwood supra note 20, at 440.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2002) (requiring lawyers to take “reasonable precautions to prevent . . . information from
coming into the hands of unintended recipients”).
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2002) (stating that
conflict of interest is created when lawyers represent clients with directly adverse interests).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70
(2000) (affirming that “[p]rivileged persons . . . are the client[,] . . . the client’s
lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between them, and
agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation”). For a discussion of the
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, see generally id. § 4.
42. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1995) (proposing a new paradigm, “the
practice of law is a business,” to explain the state of legal professionalism).
43. See RICHARD L. ABEL, Ch. 5 Restrictive Practices: Controlling Production by Producers, in AMERICAN LAWYERS 112, 112–26 (1991).
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only driving forces behind the expansion and strengthening of
44
unauthorized practice of law statutes.
3. Methods of Enforcement
Each state’s highest court has the inherent power to regu45
late the practice of law within the state. This authority is typically delegated to state bar associations or unauthorized practice committees, who act as the primary interpretive,
investigative, and enforcement mechanisms in most jurisdic46
tions. In some jurisdictions, multiple authorities enforce unauthorized practice rules, including state attorneys general,
private individuals, state bar committees, supreme court com47
mittees, and local county attorneys. States have implemented
a variety of sanctions and strategies to enforce unauthorized
practice regulations. The most common include civil injunc48
49
50
tions, restitution, disbarment, suspension, criminal and
44. See generally Rhode, supra note 25, at 3–42 (discussing the historical
development of unauthorized practice of law rules and conducting an empirical analysis of contemporary unauthorized practice of law enforcement activity).
45. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, Regulation of Lawyers and the Legal Profession: Inherent Powers of Courts to Regulate Lawyers, in MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 22–24 (West 1986) (explaining that courts have chosen to regulate the
legal profession on a theory of inherent power, and through the “negative inherent powers doctrine [most courts] assert[ ] that only the courts, and not the
legislative or executive branches of government, may regulate the practice of
law”).
46. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T ANN. CODE §§ 81.101-04 (West 2005) (defining
the “practice of law,” establishing that the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee (UPLC) is comprised of “nine persons appointed by the supreme
court,” consisting of at least three lay citizens, and that the UPLC is responsible for enforcing Texas' unauthorized practice of law statute); see also supra
Part I.A.1.
47. See ABA Standing Comm. on Client Prot., ABA Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, 2004 Survey of Unlicensed Practice of Law Committees (Dec. 2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/2004INTRO.DOC (comparing
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law in thirty-six U.S. states).
48. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. R. § 16-22-208(b) (LexisNexis 1999); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Supreme Court of Colo. v. Prog, 761 P.2d
1111, 1116 (Colo. 1988); Bray v. Brooks, 41 S.W.3d 7, 14–15 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001).
49. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C., v. Super. Ct.,
949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998); State v. Hillbrant, No. A05-820, 2006 WL 2052872,
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006).
50. See, e.g., In re Szuba, 896 So.2d 976, 982 (La. 2005) (suspending an
attorney for 1 year); In re Caver, 841 So.2d 770, 772 (La. 2003) (disbarring attorney). Note, however, that such a sanction may do little to dissuade a nonlawyer not admitted to the bar in the first place.
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civil contempt, sanctions in the current legal proceedings,
53
54
private cause of action, and criminal prosecutions. Although
a number of remedies are available, states vary dramatically in
method and vigor of unauthorized practice enforcement
4. Defining the Practice of Law
Despite the extensive history of unauthorized practice
committees and their enforcement mechanisms, the unauthorized practice of law lacks a precise definition, and is ambiguous
55
as to whom it applies. As a result, it is difficult for courts and
legislatures to determine what activity by non-lawyers consti56
tutes the unauthorized practice of law. Yet there is crossjurisdictional agreement that legal practice extends beyond
57
representation in court, and can include giving legal advice,
holding oneself out as an attorney, and preparing legal docu58
ments. Some states also include preparation of pleadings and
51. See, e.g., In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 998–1003 (D.C. 2002).
52. See, e.g., Grenga v. Bank One, N.A., No. 04 MA 94, 2005 WL 2065117,
at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26 2005) (unpublished).
53. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Parker, 961 So.2d 784, 790–91 (Ala. 2006) (recognizing a private cause of action for unauthorized practice of law in Alabama);
Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. 1968) (“Recognizing the right of private attorneys to institute an action . . . to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law . . . which is demeaning the legal profession and harmful to the plaintiffs.”).
54. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34 -3-7 (LexisNexis 2012) (“Any person, firm or
corporation who is not a regularly licensed attorney who does an act defined in
this article to be an act of practicing law is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”);
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-43-2-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that a person who
engages in the authorized practice of law “[c]ommits a Class B misdemeanor”);
see also Hoppock, supra note 22, at 730 n.85 (“As of 2004, twenty-five jurisdictions reported to impose criminal fines. Of those, twenty-two imposed prison
sentences.” (citations omitted)).
55. See Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay
Conveyancers—Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”, 31 CONN. L. REV. 423,
450 (1999) (“The unauthorized practice of law is not precisely defined.”).
56. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 444.
57. E.g., Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230 B.R. 427, 434 (Bankr.
D. Mo. 1999) (“Montana follows the majority view that preparation or filling in
of blanks on preprinted forms constitutes the practice of law.”).
58. See Erika C. Birg, Lawyers on the Road: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law and the 2004 Presidential Election, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305, 309–15
(2005) (comparing Alabama’s narrow definition of “practicing law” to the
broader definitions of the ABA and other states such as Georgia, where “giving
legal advice” constitutes the practice of law); Blades & Vermylen, supra note
10, at 638 (“Generally, the practice of law includes rending legal advice, preparation of legal documents, and holding oneself out as engaged in the preparation of legal instruments.” (footnote omitted)).
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provision of any service that necessitates the use of legal skill
59
or knowledge to constitute the practice of law. Relevant to Internet legal services, a majority of jurisdictions require “some
type of personalized contact between the attorney and client,”
60
to constitute the practice of law, while a minority of jurisdictions uphold broader restrictions that do not require personal61
ized contact.
Nonetheless, significant confusion persists because individual states define the practice of law differently. State defini62
tions themselves are also “consistently vague,” and as the Supreme Court of Arizona has proclaimed, “[i]n the light of the
historical development of the lawyer’s functions, it is impossible
63
to lay down an exhaustive definition . . . .” The ABA Model
64
Rules, which many states have adopted, also fail to provide a
clear definition of the practice of law. In September of 2002, in
response to wide-ranging critiques, the ABA attempted to draft
65
a clearer model definition. Instead of revising the language,
the ABA concluded that a model definition was not feasible,
and issued a general report recommending that all states adopt
66
individualized definitions. Most states, however, have refused
to change the vague and broad language of the ABA Model
67
Rules.
Justice Potter Stewart’s threshold test, “I know it when I
see it,” famously used to characterize pornography, seems all
too appropriate to describe modern regulation of the practice of
68
law. As ILP technology advances, vague and inconsistent unauthorized practice statutes cloud the legality of important ILP

59. See, e.g., Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 638 (citing Joel Michael Schwarz, Practicing Law over the Internet: Sometimes Practice Doesn’t
Make Perfect, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 657, 660 (2001)).
60. Id. at 651.
61. Id.
62. See Lewis & Braverman, supra note 19, at 27.
63. State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8–9
(Ariz. 1961).
64. See Wolfram, supra note 29, at 1046 n.136 (“It took more than ABA
action . . . to make the lawyer codes . . . regulatory. That was accomplished in
the great majority of states by persuading the state’s highest court . . . to
adopt a version of the ABA model lawyer code as local law.”).
65. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 449.
66. Id.
67. Wolfram, supra note 29, at 1046.
68. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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services, and may significantly affect its potential for widespread public use.
B. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNET LEGAL SERVICE TECHNOLOGY
Online legal service technologies first appeared in the mid69
1990s, shortly after the creation of the World Wide Web. Initially, these websites were comprised of basic legal information
databases that displayed text-based explanations of the law
70
and individual rights. The web pages had no documentdrafting capabilities and provided relatively minimal benefit to
71
low-income individuals in need of legal services. At the turn of
the millennium, a select few companies began to offer pre72
prepared documents through their websites. Advances in Internet technology prompted companies to incorporate more intuitive and user-friendly designs, expand the number of availa73
ble services, and encouraged dozens of new entrants to the
74
increasingly profitable field. Mylawyer.com, Inc., one of the
earliest providers of online legal document preparation, saw
75
100% revenue growth in 2003. Perpetuated by growth and
competition, availability of certain legal document and information services grew dramatically while costs to consumers
shrank.
Since 2007, ILPs have become progressively larger and
more sophisticated. Significantly, many ILPs have made advancements from standardized forms to automated document
76
assembly. Instead of providing pro-forma documents in a
printable format, users can now enter relevant information in
intuitive and user-friendly prompts, and the Internet software
converts user submissions into court-ready documents. Web
69. Johnson, supra note 13, at 260.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 261.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., COMPLETE CASE, http://www.completecase.com (last visited
Oct. 31, 2012) (online divorce); LEGALZOOM INC., http://www.legalzoom.com
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (online wills, divorce, incorporations);
SMARTLEGALFORMS, http://www.smartlegalforms.com (last visited Oct. 31,
2012) (online divorce, bankruptcy, incorporations, wills).
75. Richard S. Granat, On-Line Legal Services for Low and Moderate Income Clients: Private Market Solutions to Meeting Legal Needs 3 (June 19,
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ilagnet.org/
conference/general2003/papers/richard_granat.pdf.
76. See, e.g., RAPIDOCS, http://www.epoq.co.uk/document-automation/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2012).
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companies like Nolo and Rocket Lawyer generate hundreds of
thousands of these prepared documents for consumers every
77
year. LegalZoom claims to have prepared a million wills since
78
its founding.
Beyond document preparation, companies such as “Total
79
Attorneys” are establishing virtual law offices on the Internet.
These websites facilitate attorney-client interactions to create
80
and modify documents, share calendars, and monitor billing.
81
82
Other sites, such as JustAnswer and LawGuru, allow users
to ask a legal question, and get an answer, (sometimes) from a
83
lawyer. As the ILP industry has grown, so too have its profits;
LegalZoom is estimated to have earned $250 million in revenue
84
in 2011. Consumers are benefiting as well, using these prod85
ucts as affordable alternatives to hiring an attorney.
As the number of people using the Internet to transact
business increases, so too does the demand for online legal services. In January 2009 alone, an estimated 4.5 million individ86
uals used an Internet legal webpage for advice and solutions.
Although the precise demand is unknown, the trend towards
77. Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect
on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
527, 538 (2008) (noting that Nolo's and Quicken Willmaker Plus’s sales increased nearly thirty-three percent in 2006 and that LegalZoom has served
500,000 people since 2000).
78. Richard S. Granat, President, DirectLaw, Inc., Co-Chair, ABA’s
eLawyering Task Force, Address at the American Bar Association Commission
on Ethics 20/20, Online Legal Services: The Future of the Legal Profession 18
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/submissions.pdf.
79. See, e.g., TOTAL ATTORNEYS, http://www.totalattorneys.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); LEGAL ACCESS MGMT. GROUP, http://www.virtuallawoffice
.net (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
80. See TOTAL ATTORNEYS, supra note 79.
81. JUST ANSWER, http://www.justanswer.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
82. LAW GURU, http://www.lawguru.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
83. Attorneys participate in this arena to exhibit proficiency and presumably to find clients. William Hornsby, Challenging the Legal Academy to a Dual (Perspective): The Need to Embrace Lawyering for Personal Legal Services,
70 MD. L. REV. 420, 428 (2011).
84. The 100 Most Valuable Startups in the World, Revamped and Revised,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/2011-digital -100.
85. See, e.g., BY THE PEOPLE SAN LEANDRO, http://www.bythepeoplesl.com
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (advertising savings of fifty–seventy percent over
in-person attorney’s fees).
86. Stephanie L. Kimbro, Esq., Owner, Kimbro Legal Services, LLC, Cofounder, Virtual Law Office Technology, LLC, Technology Evangelist, Total
Attorneys, Address at the American Bar Association Commission on Ethics
20/20, Virtual Law Practice: Taking All or a Portion of Your Practice Online 24
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.aba.net.org/ethics2020/submissions.pdf.
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ILPs is taking place within the increased size and scope of
87
modern web-based technology more generally. By some
counts, there are roughly 1.25 billion unique Internet users
who have access to more than 600 billion distinct webpages
88
(there were fewer than 40 million Internet users in 1996). To89
day’s consumers use the Internet for medical diagnoses, to or90
91
der prescription medications, conduct business, perform
92
93
stock trades, or close on a loan or mortgage. As one author
notes, “[s]oftware and Internet services are eroding the territory that was once the exclusive domain of many professionals,
94
including physicians, accountants, bankers, and brokers.” Attorneys are notably omitted from this list.
Unfortunately, significant demand for legal services by low
and middle-income individuals continues to go unmet despite
95
the emergence of ILPs. The situation has worsened in the
wake of the recession beginning in 2008, which reduced legal
96
aid in many states.
C. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
RULES AND ILPS
The growth in ILPs poses a significant challenge to the local nature of legal practice regulation. Constitutionally, the
federal government has authority under the Commerce Clause
97
to regulate the Internet, which presumptively includes ILPs.
87. Fischer, supra note 11, at 123.
88. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES 19 (2008).
89. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Two Online Health Site Operators to Announce a Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at C2, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03deal.html?ref=webmdhealthcorporation.
90. See Greg Miller, A Turf War of Professionals vs. Software, L.A. TIMES,
(Oct. 21, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/21/news/mn-34752.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., E-TRADE, www.etrade.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
93. See Miller, supra note 90.
94. Fischer, supra note 11, at 123.
95. Ashby Jones, Lean Times at Legal Aid, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan 7,
2011, 9:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/07/lean-times-at-legal-aid/.
96. See id.; see also Painter, supra note 15, at 45 (citing ABA Coal. for
Justice Report on the Survey of Judges on the Impact of the Economic Downturn on Representation in Courts, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/PublicDocuments/CoalitionforJusticeSurveyRepor
t.authcheckdam.pdf ) (stating that unrepresented litigants have increased,
which has negatively affected the outcomes of their litigation).
97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. For a general discussion of exclusive federal government regulation of the Internet under the commerce clause, see
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Yet this federal power invariably conflicts with traditional state
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law. Practically, territorial limits of unauthorized practice statutes clash with increased demands for business mobility and the multi98
jurisdictional nature of Internet legal resources. These challenges have led many state bar associations to resist the expansion of ILPs through lawsuits and strengthened unauthorized
99
practice of law statutes.
Confrontation between legal self-help mechanisms and
practice of law regulation traces its roots to self-help books and
100
legal kits, which gained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s.
After decades of controversy and contradictory court opinions, a
majority of jurisdictions today do not classify the use of self101
help kits as the practice of law. To determine whether the
practice of law exists, these jurisdictions focus on the existence
of a personal relationship and if the consumer receives tailored
102
information. Though courts have found that books and kits
lack these elements, they are not so obviously absent in online
103
legal software. As a result, and considering the popularity
and potential benefits of Internet legal resources, regulation of
legal self-help mechanisms have attracted the attention of
courts and scholars.
As ILPs are relatively new, there is little case law on unauthorized practice statutes application to Internet legal re104
sources. Indeed, most instances of unauthorized practice en105
forcement against ILPs have resulted in settlements. In the
Dan L. Burk, How State Regulation of the Internet Violates the Commerce
Clause, 17 CATO J., no. 2, 1997 at 147, 153–60 (1997), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj17n2/cj17n2-2.pdf.
98. See Lewis & Braverman, supra note 19, at 26.
99. See e.g., Fischer, supra note 11, at 130 (“A leading method of keeping a
check on this rapidly-evolving market is heightened enforcement of regulations against the unauthorized practice of law.”).
100. For a history on legal self-help books, do-it-yourself kits and the unauthorized practice of law, see French, supra note 11, at 101–07.
101. See Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651 (stating that use of selfhelp kits does not meet the “personalized contact” requirement to qualify as
the practice of law in a majority of jurisdictions).
102. See supra Part I.A.4.
103. French, supra note 11, at 115.
104. Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651.
105. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 510 (W.D.
Mo. 2010) (discussing a class action lawsuit involving 14,000 litigants which
resulted in settlement); see also Carrie Weimar, DIY Stores Walk Fine Line
Between Law Help, Outlaw, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, http://
www.sptimes.com/2007/03/19/Southpinellas/DIY_legal_stores_walk.shtml
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leading court test of ILPs, the Texas Bar’s unauthorized practice of law committee filed suit in U.S. District Court in Texas
alleging that Parson Technology, Inc., owner of the product
Quicken Family Lawyer, engaged in the unauthorized practice
106
of law by providing software that generated legal documents.
The court ruled for the petitioner bar association, characterizing the software as a “cyberlawyer,” and enjoined its sale in
107
Texas. Before the case was heard on appeal, the Texas legislature changed the definition of unauthorized practice of law to
state: “[T]he practice of law does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale . . . [of] computer
software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the
108
advice of an attorney.” The Texas Legislature’s action may
reveal broader attitudes that align ILP regulation with that of
109
permissible self-help kits.
Nevertheless, numerous practice-of-law committees continue to claim that ILPs are significantly different than books
and kits, and find that the more interactive ILPs amount to the
110
practice of law. One author argues that the “[a]pplication
of . . . [traditional] tests would, under traditional [unauthorized
practice of law (UPL)] concepts, result in a ban on interactive

(discussing a 2006 settlement for $90,000 between “We The People” and the
State of Tennessee for alleged violations of the unauthorized practice of law).
But see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ohio 2008)
(issuing an injunction and imposing civil penalties against "We The People" for
engaging in authorized practice of law).
106. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d
956 (5th Cir. 1999).
107. Id.
108. Texas H.R. 1507, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999).
109. See Palomar, supra note 55, at 431 (pointing out that “[s]everal state
courts and legislatures, as well as both the Federal Trade Commission and the
United States Department of Justice, have declined to accept mere assumptions as grounds for permitting unauthorized practice laws to restrict lay providers’ right to pursue their occupations and the public’s right to choose” (citation omitted)).
110. See, e.g., Douglas S. Malan, Picking a Fight Against Online Competition, 35 CONN. L. TRIB., no. 50, Dec. 14, 2009, at 5 (quoting Louis Pepe, Chair
of the Connecticut Bar Association Task Force, who believes that LegalZoom
and “[similar] websites are breaking the law by providing legal services in a
state in which they are not licensed to practice”). In late 2009, the Connecticut
Bar Association lobbied the state judiciary committee on a proposed bill that
would make the unauthorized practice of law a felony rather than a misdemeanor. Id.
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111

legal software.” ILPs, specifically LegalZoom, share this concern, which often settles unauthorized practice claims to avoid
112
adverse case law that could potentially eliminate its industry.
Significantly, these fears may prevent investment which can
113
move the industry forward, and provide the innovation and
utility which exists in other online industries.
II. OUTDATED UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTES
STIFLE THE IMPORTANT GROWTH OF ILPS
Harm resulting from the unauthorized practice of law is
114
historically overstated. Parallel advancements in information
technology and consumer sophistication make prospective inju115
ry even more remote today. Ultimately, stifled ILP innovation is a troubling consequence of preserving outdated unau116
thorized practice rules.
Today, ILPs lag behind other
industries’ online proficiencies and underutilize technology’s
potential to increase access and efficiency in the justice system.
A. SHAKY FOUNDATION: PRESERVING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW STATUTES WITH OUTDATED RATIONALES
Despite the legal profession’s trepidation over non-lawyer
117
products and services, there is little evidence that unauthor118
ized practice poses a significant danger to consumers. A study
of 144 reported unauthorized practice cases from 1908 to 1969
119
concluded that only twelve involved “specific injury.”
Bar
committees initiate a vast majority of unauthorized practice ac111. Cynthia L. Fountaine, When is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 147, 151 (2002).
112. Cf. Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement,
and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 221, 250 (2000) (discussing a Merrill Lynch settlement for “twice the
amount of the federal tax liability dispute” to avoid adverse Tax Court precedent).
113. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12.
114. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 139 (stating “there is strikingly little
case law involving injury to individuals from unauthorized practice [of law]”).
115. See id. at 144 –45.
116. See Granat, supra note 78, at 13 (stating that “the threat of a charge
of [unauthorized practice of law] can chill innovation”).
117. See supra Part I.A.2.
118. See Hoppock, supra note 22, at 725–26.
119. Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203 n.235 (1980).
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tions to investigate potential injuries, as opposed to individuals
120
alleging concrete harm. In fact, one study found that only two
percent of unauthorized practice inquiries, investigations, and
121
complaints arise from consumer complaints. The same study
concluded that only eleven percent of reported unauthorized
practice cases involving laypersons followed from any injury at
122
all. Evidence regarding harmful effects of laypersons utilizing
123
124
ILPs is equally sparse. Recent cases involving TurboTax
125
and LegalZoom further this claim, as petitioners in both cases relied almost exclusively on unauthorized practice of law
regulations for their respective causes of action. This fact alone
is not dispositive, though the conspicuous lack of alleged harms
strongly suggests that the often repeated traditional consumer
protection rationale may be misplaced.
In addition, traditional unauthorized practice justifications
are ill-adapted for contemporary consumers, who can instantaneously access information on virtually any topic. Though this
information may not be comprehensive, the ability to obtain
vast quantities of information with unprecedented ease certain126
ly improves consumer savvy. Unauthorized practice statutes
assume a pre-Internet level of naivety that simply no longer exists for growing numbers of sophisticated computer users. Individuals seeking legal services can benefit from the experience of
past purchasers. Reputation systems allow buyers to leave
comments on websites grading the service they received or stat127
ing their level of product approval. “AngiesList.com” for home
services and “Superlawyers.com” for attorneys are examples of
profitable reputation systems modeled on reliable and unadul-

120. Id. at 203; see also ABA Standing Comm. on Client Prot., supra note
47, at 1–2.
121. Rhode, supra note 25, at 43.
122. Id.
123. Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651; see Fischer, supra note 11,
at 140.
124. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d
956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
125. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 508 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
126. Stefanie Olsen, Intelligence in the Internet Age, CNET NEWS (Sept. 19,
2005, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Intelligence-in-the-Internet-age/210011395_3-5869719.html (“What's undeniable is the Internet's democratization
of information. It's providing instant access to information and, in a sense, improving the practical application of intelligence for everyone.”).
127. See, e.g., ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012).

726

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:709

128

terated consumer reviews. The success of these companies
suggests that a similar reputation and rating system would
likely develop for advanced ILPs. These reputation and rating
systems would direct consumers to reliable legal resources and
provide important information to create knowledgeable, capable, and savvy consumers of ILPs. As the ABA itself has recognized: “[W]hen consumers know the pros and cons of the choices of assistance, they will make reasonable ones with which
129
government need not unduly interfere.”
Moreover, market forces create strong incentives for ILPs
to create reliable, cost-efficient and non-harmful products. A
fundamental justification for strict unauthorized practice statutes is that low-cost, non-attorney services will be inherently
130
low quality. Yet there is evidence that in many settings, nonattorney resources can provide legal services as effectively, if
131
not more effectively, than lawyers. Economic theory also indicates that increased competition in the online legal market
132
would create “better quality services at lower cost.” Companies must innovate and increase value to maintain customers,
which includes continued implementation of consumer safeguards. A prominent example of this phenomenon is the financial industry, where banks continue to spend millions to add
133
layers of authentication and “toughen encryption schemes.”
Increasing safety is not merely ethical for these companies, it’s
good business. Similar strong market incentives would likely
apply to ILPs as well.
Furthermore, outlets for consumer safety already exist
within the law. Aggrieved consumers have remedies through
128. Id.; SUPERLAWYERS MAG., www.superlawyers.com (last visited Oct.
31, 2012). Superlawyers further the reputation model with independent research, peer nominations, and peer evaluations. Id.
129. ABA COMM. ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 133.
130. See Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15, 34 (1998).
131. See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998) (studying four different legal settings: unemployment compensation claims appeals, Social Security disability appeals,
state tax appeals, and labor grievance arbitrations, and finding that
nonlawyers can be effective advocates, in some situations more effective than
lawyers).
132. See Pearce, supra note 42, at 1273.
133. Why Customer Authentication Needs to go Straight to the Source,
(Sept.
5,
2012),
http://www.trustid.com/blog/tag/customer
TRUSTID
-authentication/; Visa Unveils Next Step in Authentication Strategy,
CSPNET.COM (Aug. 21, 2012), www.cspnet.com/news/technology/articles/visa
-unveils-next-step-authentication-strategy.
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135

malpractice actions grounded in tort, contract, and con136
sumer protection laws. Malpractice remedies already serve as
137
a strong deterrent against unreliable legal advice. Seen from
this perspective, unauthorized practice mechanisms as consumer protection remedies are redundant; existing market
forces already incentivize consumer protection, while a variety
of legal actions provide significant tools for redress.
The need to regulate ILPs becomes even more problematic
when looking at analogous developments in other sectors of our
economy that have safely adapted information technology to aid
consumers. In this regard, medicine serves as a good example.
Over the past decade, the Internet has changed the face of
138
healthcare. Health-related sites provide highly specific and
practical advice on caring for “every imaginable condition from
139
the most routine to the most deadly and complex.” These
sites provide conventional medical advice as well as alternative
methods, and provide access to vast medical resources including journals, presentations, and research tools that would oth140
erwise be unclear or difficult to find.
134. Hoppock, supra note 22, at 727.
135. Id.
136. Fischer, supra note 11, at 145.
137. See generally Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of
Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.1533, 1534 –45 (1992).
138. Pam R. Rajendran, The Internet: Ushering in a New Era of Medicine,
285 MS JAMA 804, 804 (2001), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/
data/Journals/JAMA/4771/JMS0214.pdf.
139. Michael S. Goldstein, The Persistence and Resurgence of Medical Pluralism, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 925, 936 (2004); see also P. Greg Gulick,
E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal, Regulatory, Cultural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and Cybermedicine
Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 351, 355–56 (2002) (describing the emerging “e-health” industry and the increasing use of the Internet by patients to
consult medical information and advice). See generally Barbara J. Williams,
Virtual Web Wave of the Future: Integration of Healthcare Systems on the Internet, 76 N.D. L. REV. 365 (2000) (exploring the rise of the medical community’s use of computer information systems).
140. Goldstein, supra note 139, at 936. An enormous volume of users visit
these sites; statistics show that up to 55 percent of all Internet users access
online health information. See Matthew Breckons et al., What Do Evaluation
Instruments Tell Us About the Quality of Complementary Medicine Information on the Internet?, 10 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e3 (2008), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2483844. As a result, the industry is growing. WebMD claimed more than $570 million in revenue for 2010.
See YAHOO FIN. WEBMD HEALTH CORP., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?
s=WBMD (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). Within the past year, researchers at
Mayo Clinic and I.B.M. launched a website for collaboration in the tools used
for searching records and data stores of all kinds in medicine. See Steve Lohr,
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Many believe online healthcare technology has revolutionized the industry for the better. Personalized Internet medical
services such as “telemedicine,” where a doctor receives patient
information and disburses medical advice online, have been
141
tremendously successful. A number of scholars point out that
telemedicine plays an instrumental role in alleviating current
142
health care crises in the United States. Scholars also consider
web-based diagnostic services an important medical advancement. The New York Times Magazine review of the Mayo Clinic’s online “Symptom Checker” stated, “[w]hat you’ll get is: No
143
hysteria. No drug peddling. Good Medicine. Good ideas.” Furthermore, experts have conducted significant research on the
144
reliability of these websites and numerous non-profit foundations and agencies monitor online medical advice, and provide
145
analytics and advice for consumers. Though there are certainly concerns about medical advice on the Internet, there is a
general consensus that the benefits of online medical resources
146
outweigh the risks. It is thus especially interesting that the
capabilities of these on-line medical systems are well beyond
those of existing ILPs, in quality, depth, and personalized service.
As in law, the online delivery of medical advice and financial services has significant potential for abuse. Why then are
consumers permitted to entrust their health and wealth to the
Internet, yet when it comes to drafting an uncontested divorce,
the risk is simply too great? Diagnostic legal websites, which
are currently illegal in every state, would presumably operate
and function similarly to their medical counterparts. Advanced
Health Care Industry Moves Slowly onto the Internet, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr.
5, 2009, 1:35 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/health-care
-industry-moves-slowly-onto-the-internet.
141. See Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Constitutionality of Current Legal
Barriers to Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions
of Its Relationship to National and International Health Care Reform, 21
HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAW-MED. 385, 389 (2011).
142. See id.
143. Virginia Heffernan, A Prescription for Fear, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06FOB-Medium-t.html.
144. See, e.g., id.
145. E.g., HEALTH ON NET FOUND., http://www.hon.ch/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2012); MED. LIBR. ASS’N, http://mlanet.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); NAT’L
LIBR. MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/webeval/webeval.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2012).
146. See Gupta & Sao, supra note 141, at 386–88; see also Susan E.
Volkert, Telemedicine: Rx for the Future of Health Care, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 147, 153 (2000).
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ILPs would apply facts to the law; suggest legal precedents,
statutes, available legal actions and attorneys. Consumers
would see such material as background information and suggestive action. Indeed, individuals do not reflexively transport
themselves to an operating table simply because a website told
them they have serious heart disease. The information triggers
a process, and empowers the consumer to seek remedies or professionals if necessary. Ultimately, there is little market evidence that online legal resources pose a significant danger to
consumers. Individuals receive protection through unprecedented access to information, redress through malpractice actions, and market forces which promote creating and maintaining safe and reliable products.
B. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES INHIBIT ILP
INNOVATION
The legal bar’s general concern with “public interest” neglects other important public priorities such as freedom of
choice, encouraging market-based innovations, and more wide147
ly available legal services. Current legislative pressures to
create new regulatory measures for the Internet also inhibit
important investment in, and development of, advanced Inter148
net resources.
Consequently, bar associations and legislatures defend themselves from new advances with strict unauthorized practice rules, rather than embrace them with
149
innovative ways to deliver legal services.
As technology advances, some experts envision cuttingedge online systems which can diagnose and analyze legal issues, provide basic advice and information, and generate rele150
vant court-ready documents. The development of such valuable systems is capital intensive, and large investments of this
151
type typically come from non-attorney businesses. Penetrating consumer legal markets likely requires collaboration with
professionals in marketing, finance, system engineering and
152
project management. Yet as one ABA journalist comments:
147. See Christensen, supra note 119, at 201–02.
148. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 148.
149. See SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 99.
150. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12; see also Johnson, supra note 13, at
278–79.
151. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12.
152. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, A.B.A.
J., no. 7, 2011 40, 45–47.

730

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:709

“Few lawyers have the time, financial wherewithal or risk tol153
erance to play in this league.” Attorneys are simply unwilling, or unable, to invest the necessary resources to create the
type of advanced systems to succeed in the consumer-driven In154
ternet market. As a result, advanced ILPs by non-attorney
corporations, who are more familiar with this type of risky investment and specialized entrepreneurship, are likely to pro155
duce such services.
Nevertheless, unclear and inconsistent unauthorized practice rules create confusion among attorneys, individuals, and
businesses alike. Historically, legal uncertainty affects inves156
tors’ willingness to invest in any industry. The potential for
regulation from fifty fluctuating sets of rules thus discourages
157
investors interested in online legal space. One entrepreneur
familiar with venture investment in online legal resources stated that vague unauthorized practice rules were the “single
most debilitating factor” for the efficient creation of online legal
158
resources. That same entrepreneur argued that adjustments
made to act in accordance with these rules “decreased the utili159
ty of the product significantly.”
Indeed, judicial decisions or legislative resolutions may be
necessary “to clear the Internet’s murky waters” before companies engage in the research and development essential to create
153. See id; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 254 (“Just as librarians
did not create Google, lawyers may not create tomorrow’s innovations in legal
practice.”).
154. See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 152 (arguing that the traditional law firm billing structure prevents the risk-taking and experimentation
that is necessary for innovation).
155. See supra Part I.A.4.
156. See generally Sophie Manigart et al., Determinants of Required Return
in Venture Capital Investments: A Five-Country Study, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING
291, 298 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0883902600000677 (“Differences in the institutional, legal and cultural environment, and in dominant corporate governance systems may significantly influence the conduct of business.” (citation omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Skype Interview with Tanner Doe, Entrepreneur (Nov. 17,
2011) (on file with author) (stating in reference to online legal space that
“many people [are] waiting on the sidelines before they dive in”) [hereinafter
Interview with Tanner Doe]; see also Skype Interview with Erin Doe, Entrepreneur (Nov. 16, 2011) (on file with author) (discussing roadblocks to entrepreneurs interested in providing online legal services). Both individuals
wished to remain anonymous due to the current nature of their employment.
Each individual receives a pseudonym here.
158. Interview with Tanner Doe, supra note 157, at 13:12.
159. Id. at 11:34.
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160

advanced ILP services. Yet state legislatures and courts alike
have been reluctant to promulgate explicit rules regarding the
161
unauthorized practice of law. Fears of adverse precedent motivate industry players to work against definitive decisions as
well. Since their emergence, ILPs have preferred settlements
162
over potentially clarifying adjudications. The cyclical result
perpetuates ambiguity, which in turn inhibits new investment
163
in more advanced systems.
Additionally, unauthorized practice rules divert ILP development away from those who most need it. ILPs spend significant resources to defend unauthorized practice lawsuits, which
164
focuses their resources away from investment. More specifically, the current legal landscape largely tolerates existing ILP
document preparation services, such as wills and incorporation
165
documents, as well as lawyer referral networks. Yet the bulk
of those who need legal assistance, and cannot afford it, require
legal diagnostic systems and responsive legal information, not
166
forms for wills and business incorporation documents. Unfortunately, further development of existing services fails to ad160. Marc L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Accidents on the Information
Superhighway: On-Line Liability and Regulation, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 101
(1996).
161. One exception is the Texas state legislature. See TEX GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005).
162. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 510–11 (W.D.
Mo. 2010) (class action lawsuit involving 14,000 litigants which resulted in
settlement); see also Weimar, supra note 105 (discussing a 2006 settlement for
$90,000 between Internet legal services provider “We The People” and the
State of Tennessee regarding allegations of unauthorized practice of law). But
see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ohio 2008) (issuing an injunction and imposing civil penalties against “We The People” for
engaging in unauthorized practice of law).
163. See generally Manigart et al., supra note 156 (discussing the reasons
behind venture capitalist investment).
164. See, e.g., Janson, 271 F.R.D. at 508; see also Painter, supra note 15, at
55–56 (“Several state bar associations, including Connecticut’s, have begun
investigations of online providers of legal documents.”).
165. Some document preparation services have successfully litigated
against unauthorized practice regulation. As a result, a majority of current
ILPs focus their products in this arena. See supra Part I.B–C.
166. Ronald W. Staudt, Technology, the Courts and Self-represented Litigants (June 18, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ilganet
.org/conference/general2003/papers/staudt.pdf (arguing that serving selfrepresented litigants requires “reengineering, total quality management, personalized segments of one, supply side value chains and net communities”).
The unaddressed needs discussed by Mr. Staudt are strikingly similar to those
of individual healthcare. The online medical industry increasingly meets such
needs. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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dress these significant needs. In the end, unauthorized practice
rules deter vital corporate investment in ILP systems, and inhibit the potential for ILPs to aid all actors in the legal system.
C. THE BENEFITS OF INTERNET LEGAL RESOURCE
ADVANCEMENT
ILP advancement is likely to help consumers, underprivileged litigants, courts, and attorneys. ILPs will likely accomplish this with two broad categories of innovation: commoditi167
zation of legal services and unbundling of legal services. The
commoditization of legal services homogenizes easily replicated
legal tasks, and packages these tasks for quick and inexpensive
168
delivery to customers. Routine output of legal documents and
information lowers production costs as it is unnecessary to retain a new billing attorney for every unique matter. Advanced
diagnostic systems analyze similar situations and issues, and
can disseminate information for nearly every fact pattern. The
unbundling of legal services separates the historically compre169
hensive legal package into distinct sections. The consumer is
then capable of purchasing only those services that he or she
170
needs. This process has the potential to eliminate retainers,
lower fees, and give consumers more control to determine ex171
actly what they need from a legal services provider.
With these innovations in mind, ILPs lower legal costs and
increase access to legal services for all consumers. There are a
number of situations where the lives of most non-lawyers would
172
benefit from legal assistance. Nevertheless, getting legal advice today seems “too costly, excessively time consuming, too
173
cumbersome and convoluted, or just plain scary.” ILPs’ abilities to address these issues, by efficiently and cheaply delivering legal guidance via the Internet may change this mentali167. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 262–63.
168. See id. at 262.
169. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundle Your Practice, GPSOLO, no. 18,
2001, 22, 22–23.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 26–27. The unbundled service allows clients to control their
legal work on a pay-as-you-go basis, potentially eliminating expensive retainers. See id. at 26.
172. Consider fender-benders, drafting a will, petty crimes or getting a divorce. In Connecticut, “80 to 85 percent of divorces have a self-represented
party, because most families can’t afford to hire one lawyer, let alone two.”
Henderson & Zahorksy, supra note 152, at 42 (quoting another source).
173. SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 234.
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174

ty. Furthermore, traditional legal service is reactive in nature—people seek out lawyers to respond to situations around
them. Yet most individuals would certainly choose to avoid legal issues rather than resolve them through attorneys and the
justice system. As on scholar aptly stated, “most people would
surely prefer a fence at the top of the cliff rather than an ambu175
lance at the bottom.” To the extent that ILPs can provide access to inexpensive and extensive legal guidance, before an attorney is traditionally required, ILPs create a new preventative
176
market for consumer driven legal services. In this way, ILPs
should create a “more just society in the same way that immun177
ization leads to a healthier community.” Presumably, attorneys employ similar knowledge on a daily basis to avoid disputes. As such, ILPs have the potential to democratize legal
prevention by distributing legal guidance traditionally reserved
for trained attorneys with vast resources.
In addition, ILP development is especially significant for
individuals who cannot afford legal assistance under the tradi178
tional face-to-face model. This population includes the lower
middle class earn enough money to be disqualified from public
aid but who cannot afford an attorney. According to a 2009
ABA committee report, sixty-two percent of surveyed U.S.
judges said the lack of legal representation harmed parties before them and that litigants are “generally doing a poor job of
179
representing themselves.” Though there is not yet substantial
empirical evidence that advanced ILPs would comprehensively
fix this problem, some legal help for this population is surely
better than none. ILPs provide convenient low cost legal advice
and help fill the gap left by overworked and reduced legal aid

174. See id. (“[T]his market will be liberated by the availability of straightforward, no-nonsense, online . . . systems . . . [that] will provide affordable,
easy access to legal guidance.”).
175. Id at 231.
176. See id. at 231–32.
177. Id. at 231.
178. See Painter, supra note 15, at 54; see also Erik Eckholm, Interest Rate
Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/us/19legal.html?pagewanted=all (“[R]equests for [legal aid group] services have risen by 30 percent or more.”).
179. Painter, supra note 15, at 45. Professor Painter based this opinion on
a 2010 ABA report in which sixty-two percent of judges agreed that a lack of
representation generally results in worse outcomes. See LINDA KLEIN, ABA
COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF
THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS 3 (2010).
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180

services. Individuals who live in isolated areas or who have
restricted mobility can also use ILP services. The availability of
legal services, without engaging an attorney, may encourage
individuals to seek legal guidance who would otherwise be
181
afraid to seek such advice in person.
ILP advancement can also aid the overburdened court system. The 2010 ABA report by the ABA Coalition for Justice
found that seventy-eight percent of judges believe a lack of representation to these parties negatively impacts the court sys182
tem, Ninety percent of those judges said that court procedures slow, and seventy-one percent of judges said that pro se
183
litigants use more staff time for assistance. Addressing this
problem, scholar Robert Staudt concluded that “[m]any of the
information processing and customer relationship management
tools of modern business could be applied to the challenges
courts face as they struggle to improve customer service to self184
represented litigants.” To the extent that ILPs provide inexpensive resources and a wealth of individualized information,
the court administration will see litigants who are more prepared.
Though the legal profession generally greeted ILPs with a
hostile reception, there is reason to believe that the new technology can aid attorneys as well. First, law firms and solo practitioners can utilize ILPs to aid their practice. In documentheavy practice areas, for example, new technology may reduce
unit cost and profit per document, but it could dramatically in185
crease volume, leading to higher profitability.
Attorneys
could save time and resources by allowing ILPs to apply unique
client information to pro forma documents. Second, automating
tasks allows attorneys to focus on more challenging and multi186
faceted issues. Third, ILPs have the potential to introduce
187
new consumers into the legal system. In this way, ILPs likely
supplement the legal market for attorney services, not supplant

180. See Jones, supra note 95.
181. See Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 653. This is especially important considering the broad mistrust of the legal profession. See, e.g.,
Granat, supra note 78, at 2.
182. See KLEIN, supra note 179, at 4.
183. See id.
184. Staudt, supra note 166, at 5.
185. See SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 36.
186. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 282.
187. See id. at 279–82.
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188

it. Many ILPs will likely continue to refer clients to attorneys
189
for specific, more complex matters. ILPs may also lower the
attorney intimidation factor, and increase consumer interest in
190
legal remedies for their daily problems. Regardless of these
potential benefits, ILPs, even in their most advanced form, are
unlikely to replace many of the more profitable legal services
such as complex corporate transactions and factually complex
191
litigation. Like good doctors, there will always be a market
192
for skilled attorneys.
Despite these strong justifications for eliminating current
unauthorized practice rules, some regulation of online legal resources is still necessary. Some commentators argue that the
Internet actually increases the potential harm from unauthorized practice of law because the new medium exposes a larger
193
audience to a wider variety of potential abuses. Inaccurate
legal advice delivered over the Internet can indeed seriously
194
harm consumers.
Widespread Internet use and minimal
transparency only intensifies this concern. Furthermore, because existing state rules of professional conduct generally only
regulate attorneys, ILPs carry no protection against conflicts of
195
interest and breaches of confidentiality by non-attorney ILPs.
For example, courts could force non-lawyers to testify about potentially sensitive communications between ILPs and consum-

188. See id. at 282 (“To the extent that [ILPs] bring [new] consumers into
the legal system, they expand the market rather than shift it away from attorneys.”).
189. See, e.g., id. at 283 (discussing several ILPs that have implemented
attorney referral services).
190. See id. at 268–69 (arguing that ILPs will allow consumers to overcome
their fear and mistrust of lawyers, and “gain comfort with legal assistance at
their own pace”).
191. See id. at 282 (“Large firms that handle complex corporate matters
will not be seriously affected by [ILPs].”); SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 88 (“[I]n
the future, legal service that requires considerable expertise or an ongoing
personal touch will still be in demand in the traditional way . . . .”).
192. Advanced health websites have not eliminated the need for doctors,
but it may have changed some of their traditional functions. See Anna Wilde
Mathews, The Doctor Will Text You Now, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2009), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203872404574257900513900382
.html.
193. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 90.
194. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
195. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 440 (“[C]lients of nonlawyers practicing law forgo the protection afforded by state rules of professional conduct
. . . .”).
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196

ers. Adherence to state licensing rules is also not currently
197
required of ILPs. For these reasons, there should be some
balanced regulation addressing consumer protection concerns
regarding ILPs.
Ultimately, potential benefits to consumers, unprivileged
litigants, courts, and even attorneys outweigh even the most
serious risks associated with relaxed regulation of ILPs. Important legal services are beyond the financial reach of millions
of low-income and middle-income Americans. Harnessing the
power of the Internet through ILPs has the power to alleviate
this epidemic. Existing market forces, including malpractice actions, corporate success, and modified regulation provide robust
alternatives to the outdated and stifling unauthorized practice
regime.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Fundamental changes are needed to create safe and valuable ILP alternatives to insufficient and inadequate traditional
legal services. However, an outright elimination of unauthorized practice statutes is neither a prudent nor a likely solution.
Instead, a two-part proposal should be implemented which requires action by the ABA, states, and ILPs: (a) states should
adopt a new ABA Model Rule that relaxes unnecessary regulation and advances free-market principles; and (b) ILPs should
be required to comply with reasonable state licensing, disclosure, and accreditation requirements.
A. STATES SHOULD ADOPT AN ABA MODEL RULE THAT
RELAXES UNNECESSARY REGULATION AND ADVANCES FREE
MARKET PRINCIPLES
The ABA should create a new model rule defining the prac198
tice of law over the Internet. The rule should, first and fore-

196. Cf. Hunt v. Maricopa Cnty. Emp. Merit Sys. Comm’n, 619 P.2d 1036,
1041 (Ariz. 1980) (“[T]here is no statutory privilege to protect the confidentiality of communications between an employee and his non-lawyer representative.”).
197. Granat, supra note 78, at 12. However, malpractice actions might enforce accountability. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional
Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (“The time has come to
consider legal malpractice law as part of the system of lawyer regulation.”).
198. Indeed, the ABA undertook a similar task in 2002 by attempting to
revise the unauthorized practice rule, yet failed to do so. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 449–50.
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most, separate the jurisdictional regulation of attorneys from
the regulation of multi-jurisdictional ILPs. Establishing specific
rules for ILPs will eliminate confusion for attorneys, consumers, and courts, and provide incentives for investment by companies currently reluctant to invest in this highly uncertain le200
gal terrain. Specifically, the new ABA rule should legalize
document preparation, diagnostic mechanisms, and reactive legal information provided by ILPs, assuming those ILPs comply
with reasonable state accreditation and licensure require201
ments. Authorizing the sale of non-personalized ILP products, as is now permitted in Texas, is an important first step to
202
achieve this clarity. The current reality of allowing these
products is that while many providers can sell legal software,
they cannot instruct the consumer on how to use it most effec203
tively.
New ABA unauthorized practice provisions should
thus relax restrictions on personalized features of ILPs as well.
For example, diagnostic structures that apply facts to law serve
as a linchpin between the individual and Internet legal resources. As in medicine, this feature is critically important to
enable consumers to direct intelligibly their research. A relaxed
rule will likely spur innovation, creating more advanced, interactive, consumer-friendly systems. This cascading phenomenon
is exemplified in the online healthcare industry, where personalized information already helps large numbers of consumers,
204
which in turn spurs more investment. There is strong reason
to believe this would also take place with free market ILPs, as
companies will increasingly enter the legal market “where value is being counted in billions and the current working practic205
es seem antiquated or inefficient.” Allowing the market to
drive innovation will also balance these services in many respects, as useful products thrive while ineffective or harmful
providers wither.

199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)–(b) (2012).
200. See discussion supra Part II.B.
201. See discussion infra Part III.B.
202. See TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005) (“[T]he ‘practice of
law’ does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or
sale . . . [of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and
conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an
attorney.”).
203. See Painter, supra note 15, at 57.
204. See supra Part II.A. and accompanying text.
205. SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 253.
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States should adopt a new ABA Model Rule that embraces
the potential of the Internet to increase accessibility of legal
services. Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of professional conduct is already widespread. To date, California is the only state
not to adopt professional conduct rules that follow the format of
206
the ABA Model Rule. To be sure, states will have legitimate
concerns before they adopt relaxed regulations, especially given
the speed and efficiency of the Internet and the potential for
207
significant abuse. Advertising and advanced web design can
create an impression of reliability, while masking unqualified
208
and potentially harmful legal advice. For this reason, and to
reduce likely resistance from certain sectors of the organized
bar, relaxed regulation of ILPs must be accompanied by meaningful oversight through state licensing and accreditation requirements.
B. ILPS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH REASONABLE
STATE LICENSING, DISCLOSURE, AND ACCREDITATION
REQUIREMENTS
State licensure and regulation of ILPs is necessary to alleviate the most significant concerns of legal malpractice over the
Internet. In order to receive a license, ILPs should be required
to comply with reasonable regulations that include a variety of
consumer protection standards. For example, disclosure rules
could require ILPs to state when a service is not comprehensive. Such disclosure would inform clients about the limitations
of ILPs up front, including a warning about the potential harm
that often results from misapplied legal advice. For more complicated facts, ILPs should provide background information,
while certain facts trigger attorney referrals and more information about ILP limitations. If personalized service by an ILP
employee is required, the entity sould be required to disclose
these individuals to the client. Disclosure of whether lawyers or
non-lawyers provided services, and other qualifications of these
206. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules
.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
207. See In re Bernales, 345 B.R. 206, 219, 226 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006)
(concluding that a bankruptcy petition preparer, operating through a website,
failed to disclose his limitations as an attorney and gave improper legal advice, resulting in missed court deadlines and “potentially harmful consequences . . .”).
208. See Miller, supra note 90.
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employees, also should be required. A system of accreditation
would oversee compliance and issue licenses. Existing accredi209
tation systems for web-based post-secondary schools, which
operate in conjunction with the United States Department of
210
Education, could serve as a potential framework for such Internet oversight.
Accreditation requirements also should include specific
protections designed to prevent disclosure of confidential information. This would include advanced scanning systems to
prevent malware, and network backup mechanisms. Governing
bodies could mandate certain communication rules. For example, customer service agents could be restricted to helping individuals navigate their product, and prohibited from providing
specific advice. Regulation also should also require ILP employment of a licensed supervising attorney in each jurisdiction
in which the ILP sells its product—potentially resulting in numerous supervising attorneys. These individuals would be responsible for providing accurate and up-to-date legal information. Minimum competency requirements, similar to state
211
continuing legal education standards for attorneys, also could
also be required for non-attorney creators of legal content. ILPs
should design these licensure and accreditation requirements
to ensure a minimum level of accuracy and accountability.
There is legitimate apprehension that a majority of states
may not adopt these proposals; for this reason, some advocate
for a national rule to create the uniformity and clarity neces212
sary to effectuate ILP advancement. A federal statute in particular would create much-needed nationwide uniformity for

209. See, e.g., Accreditations and Licensures, U. PHX., http://www.Phoenix
.edu/about_us/accreditation.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); HIGHER LEARNING COMMISSION, http://www.ncahlc.org/#ncahlc.org (last visited Oct. 31,
2012).
210. See Secretary’s Recognition Procedures for State Agencies, 34 C.F.R.
§ 603 (2011); The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Programs, U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/ (last visited
March 8, 2012).
211. See, e.g., Rules of the Minnesota State Board of Continuing Legal Education, MINN. BOARD CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., http://www.mbcle.state.mn
.us/mbcle/pages/rules.asp#rule1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
212. See, e.g., Peter Krakaur, Internet Advertising: States of Disarray? Are
Uniform Rules a More Practical Solution?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at S14
(“Uniform rules would level the field for all lawyers, and provide clear guidance on how to disseminate information to the public.”).
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ILP regulations and promote investment in ILP innovation.
But the regulation of lawyers for generations has been a state
function, and federal legislation preempting state law in this
214
arena is unlikely. State bar associations also would likely re215
sist such federal legislation. Although a uniform standard is
ideal for many reasons, state adoption of an ABA Model Rule
establishes a more practical mechanism by which to facilitate
much-needed change.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental premise of this Note is that states, lawyers,
and the ABA must trust consumers to use legal information
safely. Certainly, the speed and wide-spread use of ILPs presents a challenge to the legal profession, which regulates the
practice of law to protect the public from the hazards of unqualified legal advice. Yet restricting the delivery of legal services to
bar members only is an outdated quality control instrument,
creating an unnecessary and harmful scarcity of legal services.
Bar associations and state legislatures should not be so entrenched in local conventions as to disregard the clear benefits
to the public of increased access to legal services. Democratization of information, which is a fundamental characteristic of
the Internet, will over time curb potential injury from unauthorized practice actions. Market forces can drive businesses to
create increasingly more reliable and effective legal resources.
Malpractice actions will continue to provide meaningful consumer protection in many cases. And reasonable state disclosure and license requirements will serve as an important quality check on the market-driven development of ILPs.
The legal profession is not—and should not be—immune
from technology that is transforming all of us in innumerable
ways. The legal community, the unauthorized practice commit213. Federal regulation would be exercised under Commerce clause power.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. This would preempt inconsistent state law under
the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. See also Burk, supra note
97, at 147–60.
214. See Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice:
Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969,
969 (1992).
215. State bar associations are very influential in some jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Malan, supra note 110, at 5 (discussing a report by a Connecticut Bar
task force alleging that twenty websites violated Connecticut law by providing
legal services without state licensure). Due to this strong influence, relying on
states alone will unlikely create the broad, consistent regulation needed to
spur innovation.
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tees, and state judiciaries should embrace significant advances
in ILP technology, and adopt relaxed regulatory schemes with
baseline disclosure and accreditation safeguards. By implementing proper safety mechanisms to protect consumers, without substantially limiting the capacity of ILPs to improve delivery of legal services, millions of Americans will, for the first
time, be able to enjoy, safely and efficiently, meaningful access
to the judicial system.

